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I. INTRODUCTION 
I had AIDS.  I was the only gay person left in the world [be]cause 
the government found all the other gays and killed them as 
children and if they found me, they would kill me.  It’s the perfect 
way to keep a child or a teen from coming out.  We moved on to 
physical therapy.  Physical therapy was my hands being tied down 
and blocks of ice being placed on my hands.  Then pictures of 
men holding hands would be shown to me so that way I would 
associate the concept of the pain of ice with a man touching me. 
It worked really, really, really well.  My dad could barely even 
hug me anymore [because] I would scream out in pain.  Then we 
moved into heat.  [C]oils would be placed around my hands and 
you’d be able to turn the heat on or off.  So, now, if we had a 
picture of a guy and a girl hugging it was no pain.  If we had a guy 
and a guy hugging, we had physical pain.  We then went into the 
month of hell.  The month of hell consisted of tiny needles being 
stuck into my fingers and then pictures of explicit acts between 
men would be shown and I would be electrocuted.  At this point I 
was completely done.  GOD did not want me on this Earth 
anymore.1 
This is Sam Brinton’s account of his experience with sexual orientation 
change efforts (“SOCE” or “conversion therapy”).2  The purpose of SOCE 
is to change the sexual orientation of individuals through therapy, though 
most, if not all, efforts seek to convert homosexual3 persons to heterosexual 
persons.4  While not all SOCE involves the drastic measures that Sam 
endured, it remains a controversial therapy and the American Psychological 
1.  See About, I’M FROM DRIFTWOOD, http://www.imfromdriftwood.com/
about-us (last visited on Sept. 15, 2013) (detailing the mission of I’m From Driftwood, 
an organization that promotes acceptance and understanding of the lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgendered, queer (LGBTQ) community through storytelling and sharing). 
2.  See Sam Brinton, I’m From Perry, IA—Video Story, I’M FROM DRIFTWOOD,
http://www.imfromdriftwood.com/im-from-perry-ia-video-story (last visited on Sept. 
15, 2013) (relaying how Sam Brinton’s homosexual feelings resurfaced during college 
despite the “success” of conversion therapy).  Although Sam’s conversion therapy was 
conducted by a religious counselor, the treatments Sam endured are similar to those 
treatments used by SOCE therapists.   
3. This paper uses the term “homosexual” to refer to all lesbian, gay, bisexual,
transgender, and queer (“LGBTQ”) persons to maintain consistency with the courts’ 
terminology.  
4.  See AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON
APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ORIENTATION 12 n.5 (2009) 
[hereinafter APA TASK FORCE] (defining sexual orientation change efforts (“SOCE”) 
as methods that seek to change homosexual orientation through behavioral and 
psychoanalytical techniques).  
3
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Association (“APA”) encourages mental health providers to avoid it.5  In 
response to the growing controversy regarding SOCE and concern about 
the potential harm that such therapy may cause, the California legislature 
banned mental health professionals from engaging in conversion therapy 
with individuals under the age of eighteen (“SB 1172”).6  Any mental 
health provider that engages in SOCE with a minor thereby engages in 
professional misconduct, and the licensing board may censure that 
therapist.7  Within days of Governor Jerry Brown signing the ban against 
conversion therapy, SOCE therapists, advocates, and organizations filed 
two lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the ban on First 
Amendment grounds and seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions to 
prevent the law from taking effect.8  Following appeals from the losing 
parties in both district court decisions, the Ninth Circuit held that SB 1172 
is not an infringement of First Amendment free speech rights.9  The 
plaintiffs-appellants have since filed for a rehearing en banc.10 
This Comment discusses why the Ninth Circuit correctly determined that 
SB 1172 does not implicate free speech rights, and analyzes why SB 1172 
does not unduly burden the free exercise of religion.11  This Comment 
shows that SB 1172 survives heightened scrutiny and discusses why the 
trial court that issued the preliminary injunction in Welch v. Brown erred by 
5.  See id. at 66 (concluding that psychologists are currently unable to determine
the efficacy or safety of SOCE, but research indicates it may cause harm and should be 
avoided).   
6.  See Ca. Bans Therapy Meant to Turn Gay Kids Straight, NPR (Oct. 4, 2012,
12:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/10/04/162294049/ca-bans-therapy-meant-to-turn-
gay-kids-straight (explaining that the impetus for SB 1172 was a documentary about a 
man who committed suicide after years of conversion therapy). 
7.  See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 4982 (West 2013) (declaring that professional
censure of therapists includes denial, revocation, or suspension of professional 
licensure).  
8.  See Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465, at
*1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012) (indicating SB 1172 was signed on September 29, 2012,
and the action was filed October 4, 2012); Welch v. Brown, 907 F.2d 1102, 1106-07 
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012) (noting a filing date of October 1, 2012).  
9. Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1056 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that SB 1172
regulates professional conduct, and that any infringement on speech is merely 
incidental).  
10. Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 6-7, Pickup v. Brown, 728
F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2013) (claiming that the Ninth Circuit mistakenly used plenary 
review and ignored controlling precedent that favored the plaintiffs).  
11.  See infra Part III (specifying that the California and federal constitutions
protect against laws that infringe on speech or those that burden religious belief, but do 
not protect against generally applicable, neutral laws or mere conduct).  
4
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol22/iss2/7
2014] GETTING IT STRAIGHT 455
reviewing SB 1172 under strict scrutiny.12  Part II provides an overview of 
SB 1172, addressing the law as well as the legislative intent behind the 
law.13  Part II also discusses the original lawsuits challenging SB 1172 and 
the judges’ differing decisions on the free speech challenges.14  Finally, 
Part II presents an overview of the law under the First Amendment, 
specifically with regard to free speech and the free exercise of religion.15  
Part III provides a legal analysis of constitutional challenges to the ban on 
conversion therapy—the therapists’ right to free speech and the minors’ 
and parents’ right to the free exercise of religion.16  This section discusses 
why SOCE is not protected free speech and shows how SB 1172 meets the 
rational basis test.17  Part III also shows that even if the Ninth Circuit 
vacated its decision on rehearing and held that SOCE is a form of protected 
speech, the Court should still only apply intermediate scrutiny—which SB 
1172 survives—because SOCE constitutes fraud.  While the United States 
and California constitutions afford free speech their highest protections, 
neither protects fraud at that same level.18  Part IV discusses the 
implications for other free speech challenges to medical regulations, such 
as compelled speech challenges by physicians who provide abortions and 
are required to make certain statements prior to providing services, that 
might arise if the Court were to strike down SB 1172 on rehearing.19  Part 
IV also suggests ways in which the legislature could protect against future 
challenges to SB 1172, should the Ninth Circuit en banc find that the ban is 
unconstitutional as it stands.20  Finally, Part V concludes that because SB 
12.  See infra Part III (characterizing SOCE as conduct, not speech, and arguing
that if it is speech, it is fraud and unprotected). 
13.  See infra Part II (outlining the limitations SB 1172 places on mental health
professionals providing SOCE for minors).  
14.  See infra Part II (explaining the arguments in Pickup and Welch and the
differing decisions). 
15.  See infra Part II (discussing free speech and minors’ right to the free exercise
of religion). 
16.  See infra Part III (analyzing the ban on SOCE through the lens of free speech
and the free exercise of religion). 
17.  See infra Part III (showing that rational basis review is appropriate for a ban on
treatments such as electroshock therapy, effigy-beating, and encouragement to shower 
with one’s father).   
18.  See infra Part III (comparing SOCE to fraud because the therapists knowingly
make false or misleading statements with the intention of eliciting compensation). 
19.  See infra Part IV (identifying abortion laws that, if SB 1172 were held
unconstitutional, could also be held unconstitutional as free speech violations because 
they require physicians to convey information they do not believe).  
20.  See infra Part IV (suggesting that the California legislature commission studies
to demonstrate the harmful effects of SOCE).  
5
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1172 does not infringe on free speech or the free exercise of religion under 
either the federal or California constitutions, the Ninth Circuit should 
affirm its decision to uphold the ban on SOCE in the interest of protecting 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgendered, and queer (LGBTQ) youth, as well as 
preventing an onslaught of challenges to other medical regulations.21 
II. BACKGROUND
A. Sexual Orientation Change Efforts 
Sexual orientation change efforts are therapies that aim to alter an 
individual’s sexual orientation.22  Although therapists differ widely on their 
techniques, conversion therapy is generally categorized as either aversion 
therapy, focusing on physical treatments, or non-aversion therapy, utilizing 
techniques that focus on the mind and changing behavior patterns.23 
The controversial nature of SOCE has gained national attention over the 
past few years.24  In light of this attention and society’s changing views on, 
and understanding of homosexuality, every major medical and mental 
health organization has rejected SOCE as a legitimate therapeutic 
treatment.25  Despite those positions, SOCE therapists claim that 
conversion therapy is effective, profess that homosexuality is only a 
temporary condition, and tell patients that if they put in enough effort, then 
the patient can successfully reduce or eliminate homosexual feelings.26  
These therapists also focus on teaching homosexuals how to not act on 
21.  See infra Part V (concluding that striking down SB 1172 will limit the State’s
power to regulate the medical field and will lead to mass disobedience of laws on 
religious grounds).  
22.  See APA TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 12 (stating SOCE arose in response to
the idea that homosexuality is a mental disorder). 
23.  See Chuck Bright, Deconstructing Reparative Therapy: An Examination of the
Processes Involved When Attempting to Change Sexual Orientation, 32 CLINICAL SOC.
WORK J. 471, 473-77 (2004) (noting that techniques include telling patients that 
homosexuality does not exist and results from childhood sexual molestation).   
24.  See, e.g., Criminal Minds: Broken (CBS television broadcast Feb. 20, 2013)
(portraying a former SOCE patient who killed his lovers because his therapy filled him 
with shame and hatred).  
25.  See The Lies and Dangers of Reparative Therapy, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN,
http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/the-lies-and-dangers-of-reparative-therapy (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2013) (recognizing that the limited research on SOCE has disproven 
its efficacy and discussing a therapist’s disavowal of his studies claiming SOCE is 
effective). 
26.  See Quick Facts, FACTS ABOUT YOUTH, 
http://factsaboutyouth.com/getthefacts/quickfacts (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) (offering 
“facts” and resources, compiled by SOCE therapists, for youths wrestling with their 
sexuality).  
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their sexual feelings, even if same-sex attraction is still present.27 
B. Senate Bill 1172 
Senate Bill 1172 is an amendment to California’s current regulatory 
scheme for state-licensed mental health providers.28  As part of this 
regulatory scheme, California prohibits treatments that it deems to 
constitute unprofessional conduct for mental health providers.29  California 
passed SB 1172, specifying that “under no circumstances shall a mental 
health provider engage in sexual orientation change efforts with a patient 
under 18 years of age.”30  As defined by SB 1172, SOCE includes efforts to 
change behaviors or gender expressions or to eliminate or reduce sexual or 
romantic attractions or feelings toward individuals of the same sex.31  SB 
1172 does not, however, target any therapies that promote acceptance of, or 
support for, one’s sexual identity or those therapies that do not seek to 
change sexual orientation.32  Because the California legislature’s aim was 
to protect LGBTQ minors from harmful therapies, SB 1172 targets only 
conversion therapies—those therapies that purport to change the sexual 
orientation of homosexuals but often only succeed in inflicting 
psychological harm.33 
27.  See THOMAS AQUINAS PSYCHOLOGICAL CLINIC, http://josephnicolosi.com (last
visited on Sept. 15, 2013) (claiming to help patients reduce homosexual tendencies and 
explore heterosexual potential).  
28.  See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of
Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that the state has 
long regulated healthcare providers because of the harm resulting from incompetent 
practice).  
29.  See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 728 (West 2013) (censuring therapists
who do not follow proper procedure upon learning of a sexual relationship between a 
patient and a therapist).  
30.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865 (West 2013); See Wyatt Buchanan, State Bans
Gay-Repair Therapy for Minors, S.F. CHRON. (Sept. 29, 2012, 11:07 PM), 
http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/State-bans-gay-repair-therapy-for-minors-
3906032.php (reporting that Governor Brown signed SB 1172 because SOCE is 
“quackery,” with no basis in science or medicine). 
31.  See BUS. & PROF. § 865 (relying on the APA’s opposition to a medical practice
that is based on the outdated notion that homosexuality is a mental disorder or 
dysfunction). 
32.  See id. (adopting the position that although homosexuality is not a disease
requiring treatment, minors may need support programs to help with social 
stigmatization, familial rejection, and LGBTQ community adaption).  
33.  See S. FLOOR ANALYSIS OF S.B. 1172, 2011-12 Leg. Sess., at 8 (Cal. 2012)
(relying, in part, on reports from the American Psychiatric Association claiming SOCE 
may reinforce patient self-hatred, and anecdotal accounts indicating resulting 
psychological harms).   
7
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C. Lawsuits Seeking Preliminary Injunctions Against Senate Bill 1172 and 
Challenging the Constitutionality of the Ban  
1. Pickup v. Brown
The plaintiffs in Pickup v. Brown sought to enjoin SB 1172 on the
grounds that it violated, inter alia, the therapists’ right to free speech and 
the parents’ and minors’ right to the free exercise of religion under the 
United States and California constitutions.34  The plaintiffs alleged that the 
ban is a viewpoint-based and content-based restriction on speech that fails 
to serve a compelling interest and, therefore, cannot withstand judicial 
scrutiny.35  The plaintiffs further claimed that SB 1172 conflicts with the 
APA’s Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct as the ban 
requires therapists to comply with state law rather than follow the ethical 
principle of promoting patient self-determination.36 
Judge Kimberly Mueller disagreed with the plaintiffs’ characterization of 
SB 1172 and denied their motion for a preliminary injunction.37  She 
concluded that SB 1172 was a permissible regulation on medical treatment 
and did not implicate free speech rights.38  She noted that the statute 
regulates only the behavior, not the speech, of mental health professionals, 
because it does not prohibit a mental health professional from sharing 
information about SOCE with a minor and permits the minor to seek out a 
non-licensed individual, such as a religious counselor, to provide the actual 
therapy.39 
34.  See Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465, at
*1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012) (noting plaintiffs included therapists of the National
Association for Research and Therapy of Homosexuality (NARTH), a professional 
organization that encourages individuals with unwanted sexual attractions to seek 
therapeutic change).  
35.  See id. at *7 (alleging that SB 1172 applies only to therapy aimed at changing
sexual orientation, not affirming it). 
36.  See APA, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT 4
(2010) (identifying the tenet that therapists must respect patient rights, such as self-
determination). 
37.  See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 381 (2008)
(indicating that an injunction is inappropriate when the plaintiff is unlikely to succeed 
on the merits of the claim).  
38.  See Pickup, 2012 WL 6021465, at *9 (stating that SB 1172 regulates conduct
because it only targets techniques aimed at affecting a change and does not impede 
therapists from conveying an opinion).  
39.  Cf. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 634, 637 (9th Cir. 2002) (invalidating a
law prohibiting physicians from discussing medical marijuana with their patients 
because it prevented the physicians from even espousing a viewpoint).  
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2. Welch v. Brown
Conversely, Judge William Shubb, presiding over Welch v. Brown,
found that the ban on SOCE is a content-based regulation and is therefore 
unlikely to withstand strict scrutiny.40  Although he agreed with the 
defendants that SB 1172 is a medical regulation, the judge found that the 
ban nonetheless implicates free speech.41  Relying on Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, the judge found that strict scrutiny is the 
appropriate standard for all content-based regulations that, regardless of 
their purpose, infringe on fundamental rights.42  Accordingly, Judge Shubb 
granted the preliminary injunction.43 
3. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision
On August 29, 2013, the Ninth Circuit agreed with Judge Mueller and
opined that SB 1172 is constitutional.44  Because the district court opinions 
rested on interpretation of law, not fact, the Ninth Circuit undertook a de 
novo review of both district court decisions.45  It concluded that SB 1172 
only regulates the provision of a mental health treatment to minors, while 
still allowing mental health professionals to discuss their viewpoints on 
SOCE, recommend the treatment to anyone, or provide the treatment to 
consenting adults.46  The Court concluded that mental health professionals 
do not receive more First Amendment protection than other healthcare 
professionals just because their treatments are conducted through speech.47  
40.  See Welch v. Brown, 907 F.2d 1102, 1105 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (determining that
the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were denied because any 
infringement on free speech is considered to be irreparable harm).  
41.  See id. at 1111 (asserting that, since SOCE involves both speech and non-
speech elements, it implicates free speech rights).  
42.  See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2723 (2010)
(rejecting intermediate scrutiny for a statute prohibiting knowingly providing material 
support to a foreign terrorist organization because the statute is content-based).  
43.  See Welch, 907 F.2d at 1105 (deciding the balance of equities tipped in favor
of injunction as the plaintiffs would otherwise be irreparably harmed and the injunction 
best served the public interest).  
44. Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1056 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that any
infringement on speech by SB 1172 is merely incidental and therefore the law is 
subject only to rational basis review).   
45.  Id. at 1048 (noting that abuse of discretion is generally the appropriate
standard for an appellate court’s review of a district court’s determination on a 
preliminary injunction).  
46.  Id. at 1053 (holding that doctor-patient communications are entitled to robust
First Amendment protection but the state still maintains authority to regulate medical 
treatment).  
47.  See id. at 1055 (noting that when a drug is banned, the physician does not have
9
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Specifically, the Ninth Circuit concluded that mental health professionals 
who perform SOCE are engaged in professional conduct, not speech.48  
Professional conduct is subject only to rational basis review, which it 
passes easily.49  The Court declined to decide whether SB 1172 is a 
violation of the plaintiffs’ freedom of religion rights.50 
D. Protections Under the United States and California Constitutions 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits federal 
regulations from infringing upon an individual’s free exercise of religion 
and freedom of speech.51  These freedoms extends to the states through the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.52  The California 
Constitution offers similar protections to its citizens.53 
1. The Right to Free Speech
While both the California and United States constitutions protect the
right to free speech, that right is not absolute and the state may permissibly 
regulate certain speech.54  Depending on the nature of the infringement, the 
courts assess the validity of a law under varying degrees of scrutiny.55  This 
scrutiny, however, applies only when the regulation infringes on speech or 
its equivalent.56  While some conduct is so expressive that the courts afford 
a right to prescribe the drug). 
48.  Id. (comparing the therapist’s treatment to a lawyer’s disclosure of confidential
information, which is carried out through speech but still subject to professional 
discipline).  
49.  Id. (noting that to provide First Amendment protection to any incidental
infringement on speech would unduly burden the state’s ability to regulate medical 
treatments).   
50.  Id. at 1051 n.3 (declining to address the plaintiffs’ religious rights violation
argument since the plaintiffs did not “distinctly and specifically” argue the issue to the 
district court).  
51.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the
free exercise [of religion]; or abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”). 
52.  See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (acknowledging that
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to respect First 
Amendment rights).  
53.  See CAL. CONST. art. 1, §§ 2, 4 (guaranteeing the right to speak freely and
worship without fear of discrimination).  
54.  See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 717-18 (2000) (recognizing that free
speech does not always extend to offensive speech that is unwelcome and unavoidable 
by the audience).   
55.  See Welch v. Brown, 907 F.2d 1102, 1113-14 (E.D. Cal. 2012)  (concluding
that the court must assess the neutrality of the statute before it can identify the 
appropriate level of review).  
56.  See, e.g., Concerned Dog Owners of Cal. v. City of L.A., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d
10
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it the same protection as words, the courts have deemed some words as so 
worthless that they do not warrant protection at all.57 
i. Standards of Review
Courts use three main standards of review to assess the validity of state 
action: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.58  When a 
state action, such as a law or professional regulation, does not implicate 
any constitutional rights, then the court applies the rational basis test as the 
standard of review.59  As a matter of law, the state action is valid unless the 
challenger shows either that the state does not have a legitimate basis for 
taking that action or that the specific action does not rationally relate to a 
state interest.60 
When state action implicates a fundamental right, such as the right to 
free speech, the appropriate standard of review for those actions is 
generally either intermediate or strict scrutiny.61  Intermediate scrutiny is 
applicable to those actions that do not discriminate on the basis of 
viewpoint or content.62  To pass intermediate scrutiny, the state must show 
that the action is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government 
interest and that it leaves open alternative avenues for communication of 
the information that is otherwise regulated or controlled.63 
774, 785 (Ct. App. 2011) (upholding a statute requiring owners to spay certain pets 
since the law furthered state health interests and did not implicate fundamental rights).  
57.  See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972) (invalidating a statute
as overbroad because it did not limit its prohibition to only “fighting words” that 
breach the peace).  
58.  See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985)
(overruling the application of intermediate scrutiny and applying rational basis review 
because mental retardation is not a trait that is a quasi-suspect classification).  
59.  See, e.g., Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 317 (1981) (upholding, under
rational basis review, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act after finding no 
infringement on constitutional rights).  
60.  See id. at 326 (acknowledging that the Court cannot substitute its own
judgment if Congress shows a reasonable relationship between the means and the end 
of a neutral regulation).   
61.  Compare United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to a law criminalizing the destruction of a draft card), with Holder 
v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2010) (employing strict scrutiny
for a statute prohibiting support of terrorist organizations).  
62.  See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 278 (2000) (finding that
while nude dancing is expressive conduct, its regulation is content-neutral and 
unrelated to the suppression of the speech, and, therefore, it is reviewed under 
intermediate scrutiny).  
63.  See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2739 (2011) (striking
down a ban on the sale of violent video games since the state did not show a 
11
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The Supreme Court has set forth a four-pronged test for determining 
whether a regulation passes an intermediate level of scrutiny.64  A 
regulation is constitutional if (1) it is within the power of the Government; 
(2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the 
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater 
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest; and (4) the interest is 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression.65 
The court reviews those regulations that are content-based or viewpoint-
based restrictions on free speech under strict scrutiny, which is the most 
demanding level of review.66  These regulations are presumptively invalid 
unless the state can show that the action addresses a compelling interest, 
that the state narrowly tailored the regulation to further its interest, and that 
the regulation is the least restrictive means of achieving that end.67 
ii. Free Speech “Defined”
While the standards of review for free speech are fairly straightforward, 
exactly what constitutes protected speech is a more difficult question.68  
Words alone are not always sufficient to implicate the First Amendment; 
yet, silent actions that convey a message may be enough to trigger First 
Amendment protections.69  In Spence v. Washington, the Supreme Court set 
forth a two-step test for determining whether conduct is sufficiently 
compelling interest as it offered no proof that the games caused minors to act 
aggressively).  
64.  See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 (noting that when both speech and non-speech
elements are present, substantial government interests may justify infringing on free 
speech rights).  
65.  See id. at 377 (implying that a regulation satisfies the four elements if the
government’s interest in regulating conduct outweighs an incidental infringement on 
fundamental liberty).  
66.  See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 195 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(applying strict scrutiny to a prohibition on political speech at the polls because it was 
content-based).   
67.  See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010) (ruling that a law
banning depictions of animal cruelty failed strict scrutiny because it was not narrowly 
tailored to further the state interest of protecting animals). 
68.  Compare Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir.
2010) (finding that the tattooing process is protected as speech because it is 
inextricably intertwined with the tattoo—a symbol of pure expression), with Indiana v. 
Brady, 492 N.E.2d 34, 39 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (determining the process of tattooing is 
not constitutionally protected because it is only conduct).  
69.  Compare Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 400 (1989) (holding that flag
burning is protected speech because of the obvious message conveyed), with R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 372, 386 (1992) (stating that “fighting words” are a “non-
speech” form of communication because they offer no value to society).  
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expressive to rise to the level of protected speech.70  The First Amendment 
protects those actions that, despite not using any words, are so imbued with 
elements of speech that an objective viewer would readily understand the 
idea or message that the actor intended to express.71  In applying this test, 
the courts are careful to note that First Amendment protection does not 
automatically attach to conduct just because it involves elements of 
speech.72 
iii. “Speech” That Is Not “Speech”
Certain types of “speech” are so useless to society that the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly found that there is no First Amendment concern when 
states impose regulations that implicate this speech, though very few 
categories of speech meet this test.73  Fraud is one of the few exceptions, 
and the Supreme Court has made it clear that the First Amendment does not 
protect fraudulent speech.74  Under California law, four main elements 
comprise the tort of fraud: a knowingly false representation, the intent to 
deceive or induce reliance, a justifiable reliance on the false representation, 
and resulting damages.75  Generally, the statements at issue must be fact, 
not opinion, although opinions in certain circumstances will give rise to 
fraudulent action.76 
70.  See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 415 (1974) (per curiam) (ruling that
a student who hung the American flag upside down with a peace symbol attached 
engaged in expressive conduct since he conveyed a message that would be objectively 
understood).  
71.  See Giebel v. Sylvester, 244 F.3d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) (affording First
Amendment protection to a handbill because it clearly intends to convey a particular 
message to the reader).  
72.  See, e.g., City of Dall. v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) (rejecting the idea
that any time conduct has an element of expression, it is entitled to First Amendment 
protection).  
73.  See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (concluding that
there are only a few permissible content-based laws, such as those that regulate fighting 
words and defamation).  
74.  See id. at 2547 (indicating that while the First Amendment protects false
statements, so as not to chill true speech, it does not protect false statements that result 
in harm).  
75.  See Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 917 (Cal. 1997)
(detailing the elements of fraud, including a reckless disregard for the truth, not just 
actual knowledge of a falsity).  
76.  See CAL. CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1904 (2012) (instructing jurors that
when one holds himself out as an expert, the court treats his representations as fact, 
even though a non-professional would be treated as expressing an opinion).  
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2. The Right to the Free Exercise of Religion
The First Amendment protects not only speech but also prohibits the
government from infringing on the free exercise of any religion or belief 
system.77  As with the disputes over what constitutes speech, there is 
considerable ambiguity in determining what “infringes” upon religion and 
even what constitutes a “religious belief.”78 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Employment Division v. 
Smith, the Supreme Court afforded religious belief significantly more 
protection than it does today.79  Under strict scrutiny, all laws that 
substantially burdened religious freedom were invalid unless the state could 
show that the law addressed a compelling state interest and was the least 
restrictive means to address the interest.80  Unsurprisingly, few laws were 
able to meet that burden.81  In 1990, however, the Supreme Court 
broadened the state’s ability to establish laws that incidentally burdened 
religion.82  Rather than reviewing laws under strict scrutiny, the Court 
created a new test: if a law is a valid and neutral law of general 
applicability then it is constitutional.83  The Court reasoned that to mandate 
exceptions to every law that infringed upon the free exercise of any religion 
would permit an individual “to become a law unto himself.”84 
Reacting to the Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 
Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), re-
imposing strict scrutiny on laws that infringe upon the free exercise of 
77.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the
free exercise [of religion] . . . .”). 
78.  See, e.g., Alvarado v. City of San Jose, 94 F.3d 1223, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 1996)
(determining whether the statue was even a religious object for purposes of a free 
exercise claim).  
79.  See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (requiring that the
state satisfy the high burden of strict scrutiny for any law infringing on religious 
rights).   
80.  See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 702 (9th Cir.
1999) (noting that “substantial” may be satisfied by even an incidental burden). 
81.  See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234 (invalidating a compulsory school attendance
law as applied to Amish parents who refused to send their children to school on 
religious grounds). 
82.  See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879
(1990) (limiting the applicability of Yoder and Sherbert, and allowing laws that are 
generally applicable and neutral to stand).  
83.  See id. at 874 (upholding a law that resulted in the firing of two Native
Americans who smoked peyote for religious purposes). 
84.  See id. at 879 (discussing social anarchy and constitutional anomalies that
would result if individuals could use their religious beliefs to avoid complying with the 
law).  
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religion.85  While the RFRA does apply to federal law, the RFRA exceeded 
the scope of Congress’ authority to establish state law, although the states 
may enact their own versions of the RFRA.86  California has not passed its 
own version of the RFRA, and has yet to establish whether the state 
reviews laws that are generally applicable and neutral under strict scrutiny 
or a lesser standard of review.87 
Regardless of the appropriate standard of review, only those laws that 
“substantially burden” religion are constitutionally problematic.88  The 
Supreme Court set forth the substantial burden test, which finds that any 
law that predicates a benefit on conduct that causes an individual to choose 
between engaging in the conduct and not following her beliefs, or 
following her beliefs and not engaging in the conduct, constitutes a 
substantial burden.89  A court should review the law only once this 
threshold has been crossed.90 
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Reviewed Senate Bill 1172 Under the 
Rational Basis Test Because Mere Conduct Does Not Implicate First 
Amendment Free Speech Rights. 
1. Senate Bill 1172 Regulates Mere Conduct, Not Expressive Conduct or
Speech, and Therefore, It Does Not Implicate First Amendment Free 
Speech Rights.  
The First Amendment does not protect conversion therapy because the 
85.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006) (finding that the compelling interest test strikes
the appropriate balance between religious liberties and government interests).  
86.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997) (noting that Congress’s
power is limited to remedial, preventive legislation, and finding that the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) intruded into power reserved to the states).  
87.  See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court of Sacramento
Cnty., 85 P.3d 67, 91 (Cal. 2004) (declining to identify the level of review for a law 
implicating free exercise of religion as it failed even the lowest level of scrutiny).  
88.  See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministeries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378,
392 (1990) (affirming the California lower courts’ findings that a generally applicable 
sales tax did not impose a significant burden on the organization’s religious practices).  
89.  See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18
(1981) (recognizing that a substantial burden existed on an employee’s religion where 
an employee was forced to choose between fidelity to her religion and keeping her job). 
90.  See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909, 929 (Cal.
1996) (applying no level of review after finding a prohibition against discrimination 
based on marital status did not implicate a landlord’s free exercise of religion rights).  
15
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First Amendment protects only pure speech and expressive conduct.91  
Although some forms of SOCE may use speech to carry out its aim, 
conversion therapy is better characterized as simply conduct, because it is 
comprised of psychological treatments and practices that aim to bring about 
a certain result and not express an idea.92  A plain reading of the statute 
makes it clear that the ban regulates only “practices” aimed at changing 
sexual orientation.93  As the trial court noted, “practices” are actions 
designed to apply and carry out an idea and not actions that express the 
idea itself.94  The Supreme Court has indicated that the state infringes upon 
free speech rights when it restrains a speaker from communicating 
information.95  SB 1172 does not prohibit the therapist from 
communicating information about SOCE or even from suggesting that the 
patient might benefit from SOCE.96  SB 1172 only prohibits the therapist 
from performing SOCE on a patient who is under eighteen years of age.97  
Just as state and federal laws permit the government to regulate drugs, the 
government may also regulate medical treatments and procedures.98 
The nature of therapy causes significant confusion as to whether the First 
Amendment protects the speech that occurs during psychoanalysis.99  The 
91.  See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (explaining that
speech is protected to promote an exchange of ideas). 
92.  See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of
Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1054 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that psychoanalysis is 
conduct for First Amendment purposes because its purpose is to treat emotional 
suffering and not speech).   
93.  See Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465, at
*9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012) (noting that, because the statute does not define “practice”
or “change,” the court should construe the words according to their plain meaning). 
94.  See id. (citing CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1126 (12th ed. 2011))
(defining “practice” as the “application or use of an idea, belief, or method, as opposed 
to the theory or principles of it”).  
95.  See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984) (explaining that
restraints on how information may be used implicate free speech rights).  
96.  Cf. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 637 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that
prohibiting physicians from recommending medical marijuana is unconstitutional 
because it is a content-based and viewpoint-based restriction on speech).  
97.  See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) (distinguishing
between words intended to express an idea and verbal “acts,” such as cursing, which do 
not express ideas).  
98.  See Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910) (noting that no profession
is more ripe for regulation than the medical profession because of the substantial health 
and safety concerns involved in the practice of medicine).  
99.  See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of
Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1054 (9th Cir. 2000) (asserting that the First Amendment 
applies to speech during psychoanalysis but that the state may permissibly regulate the 
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words used are akin to a surgeon’s scalpel, a prescription for an antibiotic, 
or the techniques used in physical therapy; they are nothing more than the 
physician’s tool for performing a treatment.100  In fact, if one thinks of 
SOCE only in terms of aversion therapy—therapies such as electroshock, 
burning, or drug therapy—the plaintiffs would be far less likely to succeed 
in obtaining a preliminary injunction, let alone a permanent one, because 
speech clearly is not implicated through those techniques, and the state 
would be acting within its power to regulate medical treatments that it has 
not deemed effective or safe.101  While SOCE may be carried out in part—
or even in whole—by speech, regulating conduct that implicates speech is 
not an abridgment of free speech rights.102  What is being regulated here is 
the underlying conduct—regardless of the method in which that conduct is 
carried out—and not speech conveying a particular idea.103 
Despite clear precedent establishing the state’s power to regulate medical 
treatments, including mental health treatments, the lower courts disagreed 
over whether SOCE implicates constitutionally protected speech.104  
Because the speech involved in SOCE is nothing more than a form of 
conduct, the conduct, and not the words themselves, must trigger the free 
speech protections.105  Under the test set forth in Spence v. Washington, to 
constitute an infringement on the free speech rights of the therapists 
engaging in SOCE, the conduct that is being restricted must clearly convey 
the therapists’ viewpoint.106  If the primary goal of SOCE is to change the 
speech).  
 100.  Cf. O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 
1166-67 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (finding that providing healthcare is not a statement in the 
same sense as burning a flag).  
 101.  See, e.g., Sharrer v. Zettel, No. C 04-00042 SI, 2005 WL 885129, at *7 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 7, 2005) (declaring that the state may prohibit a type of treatment or provider 
because there is no fundamental right to choose a particular provider or type of 
treatment).   
 102.  See IDK, Inc. v. Cnty. of Clark, 836 F.2d 1185, 1194 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(explaining that while the First Amendment protects philosophical, moral, social, and 
ethical expressions, it does not protect every communication addressing those topics).  
 103.  See Aguilar v. Avis Rent-a-Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 854 (Cal. 1999) 
(defending restrictions on speech since the statute did not target protected expression).  
 104.  See Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding 
that some forms of SOCE that are carried out by speech and communication occurring 
during psychoanalysis are entitled to First Amendment protection).  
 105.  Cf. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (treating as conduct those 
words that have the power to present the danger the government seeks to prevent).  
 106.  See Hightower v. City & Cnty. of S.F., No. C-12-5841 EMC, 2013 WL 
361115, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2013) (explaining that even if a person intends to 
convey a message by walking down the street naked, the general public is unlikely to 
understand the particular message and, therefore, the conduct is not protected as 
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sexual orientation of those with same-sex attractions, then it follows that 
the therapists’ viewpoint is that something is inherently wrong with same-
sex attractions and that the patient needs therapy to get rid of the 
undesirable attractions.107  Yet, according to plaintiffs, they have no 
particular viewpoint on homosexuality and encourage their patients’ right 
to self-determination.108 
Alternatively, the therapists’ viewpoint may express nothing more than 
the belief that sexual orientation can be changed.109  Even if this is the 
therapists’ position, SOCE does not clearly convey a specific viewpoint, 
despite the therapists’ intention to do so.110  If the test for determining 
whether conduct falls within the protection afforded by the First 
Amendment is whether that conduct is “so imbued with elements of 
speech” that it clearly conveys a particular viewpoint and that viewpoint is 
readily apparent to an observer, then SOCE necessarily fails that test 
because it conveys a number of viewpoints.111 
2. Senate Bill 1172 Is a Regulation on Medical Treatments and Survives
Rational Basis Review. 
Senate Bill 1172 is nothing more than the state’s permissible exercise of 
its power to regulate professional standards of behavior and competence.112  
The courts presume that laws that do not infringe on any constitutional 
rights pass scrutiny provided that they address a legitimate state interest 
and bear a reasonable relation to achieving that end.113  The state has an 
speech). 
107.  See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Preliminary Injunction at 11:4-7, Pickup 
v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012)
(rejecting the mainstream understanding that same-sex attraction is a variant of 
sexuality and claiming homosexuality is the result of child molestation).  
 108.  See id. at 15:9-13 (declaring that the therapist must respect client goals and 
treatment choices and may not impose the therapist’s own preferences on the client). 
 109.  See id. at 12:17-20 (indicating that Dr. Nicolosi believes that individuals are 
capable of reducing their same-sex attractions).  
 110.  See Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(distinguishing between purely expressive activity and conduct that could express an 
idea but does not).  
 111.  Compare Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1116 (E.D. Cal. 2012) 
(noting that plaintiffs practice SOCE because homosexuality is a sin), with Pickup v. 
Brown, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 
2012) (indicating that the therapists’ motivation is supporting patients’ right to self-
determination).   
 112.  See, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996) (acknowledging 
that the state’s power to regulate health matters out of a duty to protect the lives and 
health of all its residents).  
113.  See Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of 
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interest in the protection of minors.114  Because SB 1172 prohibits a form 
of therapy whose efficacy or safety is not established, and because the 
evidence shows that the therapy may in fact be harmful, the state’s ban on 
the therapy rationally relates to its stated end.115  Although the veracity of 
the reports that the legislature relied on to determine that conversion 
therapies are harmful has not been established, the court presumes that 
statutes that do not infringe on constitutional rights are valid.116  The 
plaintiffs challenging SB 1172 bear the burden of showing that the 
legislature could not reasonably have conceived the reports to be true, and, 
unable to meet that burden, the plaintiffs’ challenge fails and SB 1172 must 
stand.117 
B. Even if the Court Had Found Senate Bill 1172 Regulates Expressive 
Conduct, the Regulation Meets the Requirements of the Four-Pronged Test 
Set Forth in O’Brien and Survives Intermediate Scrutiny. 
As is often the case when courts are faced with challenged regulations, 
the Ninth Circuit could have simply assumed, without actually reaching the 
issue, that SB 1172 regulates expressive conduct and therefore must 
survive heightened scrutiny.118  Even if the Court assumed SB 1172 
implicates free speech rights, the law would still pass the heightened 
scrutiny test set forth in O’Brien.119 
SB 1172 easily satisfies the first prong of the O’Brien test, as the states 
Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2000) (determining that rational basis was 
the correct standard of review for a licensing scheme that did not implicate 
fundamental rights).  
 114.  See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 
596, 607-08 (1982) (finding a compelling interest in protecting minors from the trauma 
of testifying in furtherance of the duty to protect the minors’ psychological well-being).  
 115.  Cf. California v. Privitera, 591 P.2d 919, 923 (Cal. 1979) (upholding the state’s 
prohibition on the administration of any drug for treating cancer that had not yet been 
approved).  
 116.  See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (confirming 
that legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power if any 
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify their actions).  
 117.  See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis, 228 F.3d at 1050 
(noting that a law withstands rational basis review if the state could have had a 
legitimate reason for its action).  
 118.  See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) 
(assuming for the purposes of upholding a regulation that sleeping is expressive 
conduct, but not deciding the issue).  
 119.  See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (specifying that a law 
must be within the constitutional power of the state, further an important governmental 
interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and be narrowly tailored).  
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retain any powers that the United States Constitution does not specifically 
enumerate as belonging to the federal government.120  As noted earlier, the 
ban furthers the state’s interest in protecting the psychological well-being 
of minors, thus satisfying the second prong of the test.121  It also satisfies 
the third prong of the O’Brien test because the legislature narrowly tailored 
SB 1172 by applying it only to minors and not all potential SOCE patients, 
and by regulating only practices that have unproven efficacy and safety.122  
SB 1172 satisfies the final prong of the O’Brien test because the California 
legislature did not enact SB 1172 with the intention of suppressing 
speech.123  Rather, based on the concern that SOCE causes psychological 
harm, the legislature passed SB 1172 to prohibit therapy practices that 
often result in vulnerable minors experiencing increased incidents of 
depression, anxiety, and suicide.124  Any incidental infringement of free 
speech is a byproduct, and not an intended outcome, of the regulation, 
which is aimed at mitigating those harmful results.125  Because the 
treatments result in psychological harm, it is only the techniques 
themselves that the state wishes to regulate.126  Just as the state may 
regulate abortion procedures in the face of medical uncertainty, the state 
may also regulate those therapy procedures that it deems potentially 
harmful.127 
Although the O’Brien test does not specifically address whether a 
regulation is content-based or content-neutral, courts only apply the 
 120.  See Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910) (stating that the state 
police power includes regulating the medical profession).  
 121.  See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972) (limiting parental 
rights where harm to the physical or mental health of children may be inferred).  
 122.  See Dream Palace v. Cnty. of Maricopa, 384 F.3d 990, 1016 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(noting that the “narrowly tailored” requirement is fulfilled so long as the government’s 
interest would be less effectively achieved in the absence of the regulation).  
 123.  See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865 (West 2013) (declaring that the purpose of 
the law is to protect vulnerable youth from harmful therapy practices predicated on 
outdated medical theories).  
124.  See Pickup v. Brown, No. 2:12-CV-02497-KJM-EFB, 2012 WL 6021465, at 
*5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012) (noting that the legislature relied on the APA’s findings
that SOCE causes harm).  
 125.  See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny because the statute targeted only the non-communicative element of the 
plaintiff’s behavior).  
 126.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973) (recognizing a state interest in 
maximizing the safety of medical procedures).   
 127.  See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 128-29 (2007) (upholding the Partial 
Birth Abortion Ban Act because the government found the procedure inhumane and not 
medically necessary).  
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O’Brien test to those laws that are content-neutral.128  While SB 1172 may 
look like a content-based regulation at first glance because the law 
distinguishes between different types of therapies, under a secondary 
interpretation of content-neutral regulations, the law is content-neutral 
because the predominant intent of the regulation is aimed at protecting 
minors and not at chilling a specific type of therapy.129 
C. Senate Bill 1172 Is Unlikely to Survive Strict Scrutiny Because the 
Regulation Does Not Address an Actual Harm, and the Regulation Is Not 
the Least Restrictive Means of Addressing the State’s Asserted Compelling 
Interest. 
Because the Ninth Circuit determined that SB 1172 is conduct, not 
speech, the Court never reached the issue of whether SB 1172 is content-
based or viewpoint-based discrimination.  Were the Court to determine on 
rehearing that SB 1172 is a regulation on speech, the Court is likely to rely 
on the traditional understanding of content-based regulations, rather than 
looking to the legislative intent to determine that the law is content-
neutral.130  The Court will likely find that the law is a content-based 
regulation because SB 1172 is a prohibition on a specific type of therapy, 
and because determining whether one is engaged in the prohibited therapy 
requires looking at the content of the therapy session.131 
Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid, and therefore, the 
burden falls on the state to prove that the regulation is not 
unconstitutional.132  With such a high burden, California will likely be 
unable to show that SB 1172 serves a compelling interest, is narrowly 
tailored, and is the least restrictive means of achieving its end.133  While 
 128.  See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011) (applying strict 
scrutiny to content-based regulations on commercial speech).   
 129.  Cf. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) 
(examining the main impetus for a regulation banning adult theaters in certain 
neighborhoods, and finding that because the regulation was aimed at the secondary 
effects of the theaters, and not speech, the regulation was content neutral).  
 130.  See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (defining 
content-based regulations as restrictions based on the subject matter, such as media 
depicting animal cruelty).   
 131.  See, e.g., Berger v. City of Seattle, 569 F.3d 1029, 1051 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(concluding that a regulation allowing street performers to passively solicit donations 
was a content-based regulation, singling out certain forms of content for differential 
treatment).  
 132.  See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2739 (2011) 
(finding that the state failed to meet its burden of showing an actual psychological harm 
from violent video games, as opposed to just potential harm).  
133.  See Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 962 (9th 
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protecting the safety and health of a minor is a recognized compelling 
interest, the state must be able to show that its regulation protects against 
an actual harm, not just a potential or speculative harm.134  When exploring 
the need for SB 1172, the California Legislature relied on the findings of 
the APA Task Force, which indicated that the potential harms from 
conversion therapies are great.135  But potential harms are not enough to 
justify a content-based regulation of free speech.136  Further, the state 
would be unable to show that SOCE is the cause of these harms, rather than 
other life activities beyond the control of the state.137  As such, SB 1172 
would not survive strict scrutiny if the legislature asserted the protection of 
minors as its compelling interest.138 
Moreover, the government likely could not show that regulating mental 
health providers who provide SOCE to minors is the least restrictive means 
of achieving its end.139  Even if the state could show that the regulation 
addressed an actual harm, many other less restrictive regulations could 
sufficiently protect the health and safety of California minors.140  Possible 
less restrictive regulations include requiring informed consent rather than 
imposing an outright ban, or prohibiting only those treatments that do not 
implicate speech at all and are questionable even by the standards of the 
mental health providers who do provide conversion therapy.141  Not even 
Cir. 2009) (noting that a compelling interest may be hard to show because no field is so 
well understood that no new discoveries are possible).  
 134.  See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2739 (striking down a statute as not 
satisfying strict scrutiny since the state did not show video games caused minors to act 
aggressively).  
 135.  See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865 (West 2013) (identifying the potential 
harms of SOCE as, inter alia, depression, substance abuse, self-hatred, hostility, and 
problems with intimacy). 
 136.  See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 819-20 
(2000) (emphasizing that anecdotal evidence and supposition are insufficient to prove 
actual harm).  
 137.  See Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1120 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (citing 
plaintiffs’ declarations indicating that the cause of the harms are unsupportive parents, 
stigma, bullying, and other factors, rather than SOCE).  
 138.  See Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. at 2738-39 (noting that ambiguous proof 
is not sufficient for showing an actual harm).  
 139.  See Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 964-65 
(9th Cir. 2009) (indicating that the burden rests on the state to show that less restrictive 
means are not available, even if less effective).  
 140.  See Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 948 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding 
that, despite a compelling interest to protect minors, requiring a juvenile curfew 
without exceptions for legitimate night-time activity was not narrowly tailored).  
 141.  Cf. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2013) (requiring informed consent, including 
disclosure of foreseeable risks and discomforts and alternative treatments, from any 
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the therapists who provide conversion therapy could characterize as speech 
the treatments that Sam Brinton endured.142 
D. Even Though Senate Bill 1172 Is Unlikely to Withstand Strict Scrutiny, 
the Regulation Is Still Constitutional Because It Falls Under Two 
Exceptions to the Strict Scrutiny Standard. 
1. Even if Senate Bill 1172 Infringes on Constitutional Rights, Regulations
that Safeguard the Health and Safety of the Public Are Reviewed Under the 
Rational Basis Test. 
The rational basis test is appropriate not only for regulations that do not 
infringe upon constitutional rights, but also when danger to health is 
present, regardless of whether those regulations implicate fundamental 
rights.143  California has a legitimate interest in safeguarding the health of 
its citizens and may infringe on fundamental rights to further this goal.144  
Although the courts have historically only applied this exception to the 
right to privacy in the context of abortion regulations, nothing suggests that 
this exception could not apply to fundamental rights in other areas of 
medicine.145  The likelihood that the state would apply this exception is 
especially high in situations in which minors are involved, particularly 
those minors the state finds vulnerable, as California courts have previously 
allowed regulations for minors that it would not allow for adults.146  Thus, 
although California’s regulatory power to prohibit patients from seeking 
conversion therapy may not extend to adults, it undoubtedly does extend to 
minors, as evidenced by the state’s willingness to mandate regulations for 
research subject). 
 142.  Cf. Pitcherskaia v. INS, 118 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1997) (equating 
Pitcherskaia’s conversion therapy, involving electroshock, with torture and 
persecution).  
 143.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (indicating that the state may 
infringe on a woman’s privacy right when the danger to her health outweighs the safety 
of the procedure).  
 144.  See Wilson v. Cal. Health Facilities Comm’n, 167 Cal. Rptr. 801, 804 (Ct. 
App. 1980) (acknowledging that the state may regulate procedures that infringe upon 
fundamental rights when there is a legitimate interest in safeguarding the health of its 
citizens).  
 145.  Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (indicating that the right to 
privacy can outweigh the right to free speech, such as when the listener is a captive 
audience).   
 146.  See, e.g., Meyers v. Arcata Union High Sch. Dist., 75 Cal. Rptr. 68, 73 (Ct. 
App. 1969) (recognizing that schools may impose stricter regulations on student 
constitutional rights than would be permissible to impose on adults).  
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youths but not adults.147  Even if the Court vacates its decision and finds 
that SB 1172 implicates free speech rights, it should still only apply 
rational basis review because SOCE poses a danger to health.148 
2. Even if Senate Bill 1172 Is a Content-Based Regulation, Sexual
Orientation Change Efforts Are Best Characterized as Fraud, Which the 
First Amendment Does Not Protect. 
Even if the Ninth Circuit were to determine that SB 1172 regulates 
speech, and rejected the danger-to-health exception discussed above, the 
Court is still unlikely to review SB 1172 under strict scrutiny because SB 
1172 protects against fraud.149  There is little, if any, question that the 
therapists’ statements result in a legal harm—a required element to prove 
fraud—because, at the very least, the claims that the therapists can diminish 
or eliminate same-sex attractions through SOCE result in a pecuniary loss 
by the patients paying for useless services, and the therapists’ intent in 
making these statements is for the purpose of eliciting compensation.150  
The patients satisfy the second element of fraud—showing justifiable 
reliance on the therapists’ misrepresentations—because the patients, often 
desperate for a “cure” for homosexuality, have no reason to believe that 
licensed professionals are touting anything more than snake oil.151 
The difficult element in characterizing SOCE as fraud is showing that 
the therapists knew their statements were false; however, there are several 
indications that the therapists know or should know that promoting SOCE 
as an effective treatment is a misrepresentation.152  First, in Welch v. 
 147.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992) 
(invalidating the spousal notice provision of the Abortion Control Act, but upholding 
the parental notification requirement).   
 148.  Cf. California v. Privitera, 591 P.2d 919, 922 (Cal. 1979) (noting that the right 
to choose an abortion does not include the right to choose the type of procedure, and 
that the regulations need only pass rational basis review).  
 149.  See, e.g., Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 917 (Cal. 
1997) (requiring that a claim of fraud show that the speaker made a knowingly false 
representation with the intent to deceive the listener, that the listener justifiably relied 
on the misrepresentation, and that the listener suffered actual harm).  
 150.  See Pohl v. Mills, 24 P.2d 476, 480 (Cal. 1933) (recognizing that paying for a 
copyrighted structure without receiving a copyrighted structure constitutes a pecuniary 
loss and meets the damages element for alleging a fraudulent action).  
 151.  See Dyke v. Zaiser, 182 P.2d 344, 351 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947) (asserting that a 
person with inferior knowledge may justifiably rely on the assertions of a speaker when 
the speaker knows he or she is the more knowledgeable party).  
 152.  See Harper v. Silver, 19 Cal. Rptr. 78, 80-81 (Ct. App. 1962) (indicating that a 
speaker knowingly makes a false statement when available information indicates the 
statement is false).  
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Brown, plaintiff Anthony Duk admits that he has never had any success 
with any of his patients;153 thus, even if he professes to believe that SOCE 
works, his statements claiming that SOCE is an effective treatment indicate 
a reckless disregard for the truth.154  Second, every major medical 
organization has rejected SOCE, and former conversion therapy advocates 
have rescinded their studies supporting SOCE.155  A reasonable person, 
aware of every major medical organization’s rejection of SOCE and who 
follows medical organizations’ ethical codes, would know or have reason 
to believe that SOCE is not an effective treatment.156 
Generally, the belief that a person can change her sexual orientation is a 
social or religious belief instead of a fact, and is not sufficient to bring 
SOCE under the umbrella of fraud.157  However, because the plaintiffs in 
both Welch v. Brown and Pickup v. Brown characterized this belief as a fact 
and, as professionals, held their beliefs out as fact to their patients, the 
court will treat their opinions as material representations of fact.158 
E. Senate Bill 1172 Does Not Substantially Infringe Upon Religious Rights 
Because the Law Does Not Force the Patients to Choose Between 
Following Their Religion and Complying with the Law. 
Though the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs waived the argument 
that Senate Bill 1172 violates their religious rights, and therefore did not 
address the issue on appeal, SB 1172 does not substantially infringe upon 
the plaintiffs’ religious beliefs because it fails the test that was set forth in 
Thomas.159  The plaintiffs alleging the violations of the free exercise of 
  153.  Welch v. Brown, 907 F.2d 1102, 1106 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2012). 
 154.  See Yellow Creek Logging Corp. v. Dare, 30 Cal. Rptr. 629, 632-33 (Ct. App. 
1963) (noting that a reckless disregard for truth is a statement made with no basis for 
its truth).  
 155.  Cf. In re Am. Coll. for Advancement in Med., No. 962 3147, 1998 WL 
847999, at *2 (F.T.C. Dec. 1998) (prohibiting the American College for Advancement 
in Medicine from claiming that chelation therapy is an effective treatment when no 
reliable scientific evidence supports the claim).  
 156.  See, e.g., Kockelman v. Segal, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 552, 558 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(recognizing that a psychiatrist must treat his patients in accordance with the standards 
of the profession).  
 157.  See Chavez v. Citizens for a Fair Farm Labor Law, 148 Cal. Rptr. 278, 280 
(Ct. App. 1978) (explaining that fraud requires a false representation of fact because 
there is no such thing as a false idea under the First Amendment).  
 158.  See, e.g., Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 768 (Cal. 1992) (finding 
that an opinion is a positive assertion of fact when the opinion is “not a casual 
expression of belief but a deliberate affirmation of the matters stated”).  
 159.  See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 
(1981) (finding that a religious burden exists where a person must choose between 
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religion are minors, and SB 1172 does nothing to regulate the behavior of 
the minors.160  The minors may seek SOCE from any religious counselors 
who perform conversion therapy.161  Because the minors are not forced to 
choose between following the law and following the religious beliefs that 
compel them to seek therapy, SB 1172 has no coercive effect on the 
plaintiffs and does not substantially burden the free exercise of their 
religion.162 
F. Senate Bill 1172 Does Not Infringe on Religious Rights Because It Is a 
Neutral Law of General Applicability. 
Freedom of religious belief is absolute; yet, the state may regulate the 
actions stemming from those beliefs if the laws are generally applicable, 
neutral, and can withstand the corresponding scrutiny.163  In the context of 
SB 1172, the religious belief is the idea that homosexuality is a sin or that it 
is not a natural way of life; the conduct is the therapists’ or the patients’ 
efforts to change the orientation to align with those religious beliefs.164 
SB 1172 is facially neutral, as it does not single out any particular 
religion and applies to even those therapists who engage in SOCE with no 
underlying religious motivations.165  Nor does SB 1172 covertly suppress 
religious beliefs, which would also destroy its neutrality.166  If the 
California legislature was primarily motivated by the religious undertone of 
SOCE, the legislature would have prohibited all SOCE, not just those 
following the law or following his religion).  
 160.  See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865.1 (West 2013) (regulating the professional 
conduct of mental health providers).  
 161.  See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865.2 (West 2013) (censuring only mental 
health providers who engage in SOCE with minors because the law is a regulation on 
professional conduct).  
 162.  Cf. O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 
1159 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (finding no free exercise violation where an employer must 
provide contraceptives through its health plan because the regulation does not require 
the employer to use the contraceptives).   
 163.  See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894 
(1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (confirming the Court’s long established 
differentiation between the religious belief and engaging in conduct associated with 
that belief).  
 164.  Cf. id. at 874-75 (implying a difference between believing peyote serves a 
religious purpose and ingesting it).  
 165.  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
533 (1993) (explaining that if the purpose of the law infringes on religion, then the law 
is not facially neutral).  
 166.  See id. (extending freedom of religion not only to laws that facially burden 
religion but also to laws covertly suppressing religious beliefs or expression).  
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forms of SOCE that are performed on minors by licensed health 
providers.167  Rather, the California Legislature relied on the professional 
expertise of the APA and other reputable organizations to find that SOCE 
reflects an outdated medical position and that the therapies often lead to 
heightened anxiety, confusion, and suicide, among other ills.168  While the 
legislative history indicates that the legislators were aware that those 
individuals who seek SOCE are generally deeply religious, the legislative 
history does not indicate any intention of impeding the religious beliefs of 
those individuals or their therapists through the Bill.169 
Not only is SB 1172 neutral, but it is also generally applicable because 
the law infringes equally on religious and non-religious professional 
conduct that is thought to bring about harm to minors.170  SB 1172 applies 
to any mental health provider who performs SOCE on a minor.171  SB 1172 
prohibits minors from seeking SOCE from licensed healthcare providers, 
but it does nothing to interfere with the minors’ ability to seek treatment 
from non-licensed providers, such as religious counselors.172  Likewise, 
mental health providers may still engage in conversion therapy with 
adults.173  Assume, for example, that half of the therapists engaging in 
SOCE are religiously motivated and half of the therapists engaging in 
SOCE have no religious convictions about homosexuality.174  Assume also 
that half of the individuals seeking conversion therapy are religiously 
motivated and half of the individuals seeking conversion therapy do so for 
 167.  Cf. id. (emphasizing that Florida banned animal sacrifice because it involved 
the Santerian practice of animal sacrifice).  
 168.  Cf. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007) (asserting that state and 
federal legislatures have broad discretion with regards to regulations in the face of 
medical uncertainty).  
 169.  See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865 (West 2013) (noting that the impetus 
behind SB 1172 is the protection of LGBTQ minors from a psychologically damaging 
“therapy”).  
 170.  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 533 (explaining that a law 
is not generally applicable if it burdens religious conduct but does not apply to conduct 
that similarly undermines the law and yet is not religiously motivated).  
 171.  See BUS. & PROF. § 865 (censuring all mental health providers engaging in 
SOCE with minors without regard to the providers’ motivations).  
 172.  See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865.1 (West 2013) (prohibiting mental health 
providers from engaging in SOCE with patients under eighteen years of age, but 
imposing no other restrictions). 
 173.  Cf. In re R.V., 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 708 (Ct. App. 2009) (allowing a probation 
term for a minor that would be unconstitutional for an adult because minors require 
protection). 
 174.  Cf. Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299, 304 (1896) (stating that a regulation 
prohibiting trains from running on Sundays is no less a regulation just because some 
religions reserve Sunday as a day of rest).   
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other reasons.175  SB 1172 does not substantially regulate only the 
religiously motivated conduct while leaving whole non-religiously 
motivated conduct.  Rather minors—both those religiously motivated to 
seek SOCE and those who do so for other reasons—are still free to access 
services from religious counselors.176  Adults—regardless of motivation—
are still free to access the services; therapists—both those with religious 
convictions on homosexuality and those without—are free to provide 
SOCE to adults.177 
Although SB 1172 is a neutral and generally applicable law, the standard 
of scrutiny that the Court would have applied when reviewing the law is 
unclear.178  If the Court applied the rational basis test, then SB 1172 would 
stand.179  California has a legitimate interest in protecting the health and 
welfare of its minors, and banning SOCE rationally relates to that end.180  
Alternatively, the ban would not withstand strict scrutiny because the 
asserted compelling interest does not address an actual harm.181 
Ultimately, because the Ninth Circuit decided that SB 1172 regulated 
conduct and not speech, the Court likely would have applied rational basis 
review instead of strict scrutiny.182  Ninth Circuit precedent indicates the 
 175.  Cf. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 1109, 1129 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining 
that laws of general applicability—those not targeting religious conduct—need only 
pass rational basis review). 
 176.  Cf. Islamic Ctr. of Miss., Inc. v. City of Starkville, 840 F.2d 293, 299 (5th Cir. 
1988) (noting that the First Amendment does not prohibit the government from 
enacting neutral regulations that make the free exercise of religion more difficult).  
 177.  Cf. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (finding that denying federal 
funding for abortions does not force physicians to give up abortion-related speech, as it 
only denies use of funds).   
 178.  See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court of Sacramento 
Cnty., 85 P.3d 67, 91 (Cal. 2004) (declining to identify the review level as the law 
passed strict scrutiny).  
 179.  See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 n.27 (2008) (noting 
that most laws pass rational basis review).  
 180.  Cf. California v. Privitera, 591 P.2d 919, 922 (Cal. 1979) (drawing on Roe v. 
Wade to find a law requiring a drug be certified effective before use is reasonable to 
protect health).  
 181.  See Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 962 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (finding that the potential for psychological harm from video games is 
insufficient to justify a ban).  
 182.  See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 
(1990) (distinguishing prior cases reviewed under strict scrutiny because those cases 
involved multiple constitutional challenges).  But see Church of the Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) 
(recognizing the illogicalness of the “hybrid rule” because it either would be so broad 
as to cover most constitutional claims or would be redundant if a law violated another 
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Court would embrace strict scrutiny only for those challenges that involve 
more than one constitutional challenge.183 
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
First Amendment challenges are nothing new in the medical field and 
have resulted in both gains and losses for moving forward science and 
individual rights.184  While the courts theoretically must decide cases based 
on an objective interpretation of the law, political bias often plays a role in 
how an issue is decided.185  Were the Ninth Circuit to rehear Pickup v. 
Brown, the liberal social leanings of the Ninth Circuit could conceivably 
influence the Court to reverse its decision if the Court were to consider the 
significant effects of its decision with regards to other areas of the law.186  
Were the Court to strike down SB 1172 on free speech grounds, it would 
likely do so based on the integrity of the physician-patient relationship and 
the need to protect resulting communications.187  If the Court were to 
protect treatment effectuated through speech, then clearly the Court must 
find that the First Amendment also protects the communications in which 
the physicians engage with patients as part of treatment.188  Striking down 
SB 1172 would have significant negative repercussions for at-risk LGBTQ 
youth, but, ironically, it could result in significant positive effects for the 
constitutional right). 
 183.  See, e.g., Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 705 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (applying the hybrid exception and requiring a plaintiff to show that the law 
violates a companion right).  
 184.  See, e.g., N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Grp., Inc. v. San Diego Cnty. Superior 
Court, 189 P.3d 959, 967 (Cal. 2008) (preventing a doctor from denying care to 
lesbians despite a religious objection). 
 185.  See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896) (upholding 
segregation because it was based on the established custom and traditions of the state), 
overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
 186.  See Maura Dolan, California Ban on Gay Therapy Put on Hold, L.A. TIMES 
(Dec. 22, 2012, 8:14 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/12/gay-therapy-
ban-placed-on-hold-in-california.html (noting that President Obama appointed the 
judge who found SB 1172 to be constitutional while President Bush appointed the 
judge who granted the injunction). 
 187.  See Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 637 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing the 
importance of affording constitutional protection to speech between physicians and 
their patients); see also Pickup v. Brown, 728 F.3d 1042, 1053 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating 
that doctor-patient communications about medical treatments are entitled to substantial 
First Amendment protection and communication that occurs during therapy is entitled 
to some First Amendment protection).  
 188.  See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22, § 75040 (2009) (requiring primary care clinics to 
provide pre-abortion and post-abortion counseling, including an explanation of 
alternatives and possible risks). 
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pro-choice movement.189 
The pro-choice community has long struggled with state regulations on 
abortion practices, including compelled speech and religious-based opt-out 
clauses for physicians and medical staff who do not want to participate in 
the provision of abortions.190  Particularly egregious are laws that require 
physicians to tell patients seeking abortions that there are correlations 
between abortion and breast cancer, that the fetus may feel pain, and that 
the fetus is a living being, despite the lack of reputable medical or scientific 
support for these statements and the fact that the physicians do not 
necessarily believe the information that they are compelled to provide.191  
Striking down SB 1172 on free speech grounds could provide support for 
pro-choice advocates to renew constitutional challenges to abortion 
regulations.192  If a physician performing SOCE is allowed to choose, free 
from state regulation, what he can and cannot say, then logically, a 
physician providing abortions should be afforded those same constitutional 
protections.193  Most notably, striking down SB 1172 would run afoul of 
Justice Stevens’ opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, which dismissed the asserted free speech rights of 
the physicians performing abortions to not engage in compelled speech.194  
While one might try to distinguish Casey from the SB 1172 challenges 
because Casey turned on the undue burden test, that test only implicates the 
privacy right associated with obtaining an abortion, and not the correlating 
free speech issues.195 
 189.  Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) 
(dismissing the physicians’ free speech claims because the speech is only in the context 
of medical practice).  
 190.  See State Policies in Brief, GUTTMACHER INST., 
https://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf (last visited on Sept. 
15, 2013) (noting that thirty-five states require counseling before abortion, five states 
require physicians to make inaccurate correlations between cancer and abortion, and 
twenty-five states require physicians to provide patients with written materials). 
 191.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 906 
(8th Cir. 2012) (finding no free speech violation when the state requires physicians to 
disclose a correlation between suicide and abortions).  
 192.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Ind. v. Comm’r of Ind. Dep’t of Health, 794 
F. Supp. 2d 892, 916 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (upholding a law that doctors must tell abortion 
patients that life begins at conception).  
 193.  Cf. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D., 686 F.3d at 905-06 (explaining that 
a state may use its authority to require a physician provide truthful, non-misleading 
information relevant to a patient’s decision, even in the absence of scientific support).  
 194.  See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (finding 
that the licensing and regulation power of the state encompasses physician speech in 
medical treatment).   
195.  Cf. Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 430 (M.D.N.C 2011) (rejecting the 
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Assume that SB 1172 is struck down on freedom of religion grounds, 
allowing mental healthcare providers to impose psychological harm on 
their patients because of their religious beliefs.  Currently, physicians who 
do not support abortions may opt out of providing them on religious 
grounds.196  This same exception—opting in because of religious beliefs—
does not exist for those physicians who hold deep-seated beliefs on the 
provision of abortion.197  Yet, some physicians do feel this way.198  Because 
the courts play a very limited role in determining whether a religious belief 
is a religious belief—looking only to whether the belief is a sincerely held 
religious belief—the state must permit physicians who provide abortions 
based on their sincerely-held religious beliefs to do so, even when 
practicing at a hospital or facility that denies abortions based on its own 
religious beliefs.199  To allow mental healthcare providers whose religious 
convictions compel them to opt out of laws prohibiting them from inflicting 
psychological harm on their patients, but not to allow physicians whose 
religious convictions compel them to provide abortions to avoid inflicting 
emotional harm on their patients, would violate the First Amendment’s 
protection of fundamental rights.200 
Sacrificing the mental health of LGBTQ youth in favor of strengthening 
challenges to abortion regulations, or vice versa, is not a suitable outcome. 
Fortunately, there is a scenario in which the courts could uphold SB 1172, 
and thus protect LGBTQ youth, while creating precedent that could benefit 
the pro-choice movement.  Upholding SB 1172 on the ground that SOCE is 
fraud, and thus not subject to First Amendment protection, would bolster 
city ordinances attempting to prevent crisis pregnancy centers (CPCs) from 
undue burden test for laws requiring physicians to give patients a verbal description of 
ultrasound images before abortions).   
 196.  See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123420(a) (West 2013) (prohibiting 
discipline of employees who refused to provide abortions).  
 197.  See, e.g., HEALTH & SAFETY § 123420(c) (specifying facilities that do not 
provide abortions may not be compelled to do so).  
 198.  See, e.g., Cassie Murdoch, Meet the Christian, Formerly Anti-Abortion Doctor 
Who Now Performs Late-Term Abortions, JEZEBEL (May 29, 2012, 6:15 PM), 
http://jezebel.com/5913841/meet-the-christian-formerly-anti+abortion-doctor-who-
now-performs-late+term-abortions (noting that Dr. Parker’s religious commitment to 
compassion compels him to provide abortions).  
 199.  See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184 (1965) (stating that a court’s 
role is to objectively determine whether the claimed belief occupies the same place in 
the life as a belief in God holds in the life of a person qualified for an exemption).  
 200.  Cf. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 591 (1989) (explaining that 
the First Amendment prohibits the expression of a preference for one religion over 
another).  
31
Bookwalter: Getting it Straight: A First Amendment Analysis of California's B
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2014
482 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 22:2 
falsely misleading women.201  Finding that the free speech and freedom of 
religion clauses in the federal and California constitutions do not protect 
false physician speech that results in harm, and also finding that the state 
may permissibly regulate that speech, would allow the state to regulate the 
false speech at CPCs that purport to offer reproductive health services, such 
as abortion and the morning-after pill, but in reality do not provide those 
services and delay patient access to such services in the hope that the 
patient will be forced into unwanted motherhood.202  Upholding SB 1172 
would provide a basis for regulating even those CPCs that provide only 
counseling, and therefore do not employ a medical staff, on the premise 
that statements based on junk science or suspect research give rise to 
negligent misrepresentation, which is an actionable form of fraud.203 
Should the Ninth Circuit en banc decide that SB 1172 does not withstand 
review, the legislature need only modify the law for it to pass constitutional 
scrutiny.204  At a minimum, the legislature should specifically target all of 
the physical SOCE techniques, such as electroshock therapy, forcing 
patients to strip down and cuddle with older male therapists, and having 
patients beat effigies of their mothers.  By only targeting the practices that 
are obviously conduct, the legislature will forestall any further free speech 
claims while eradicating some of the most offensive SOCE practices.205  
Furthermore, the legislature should commission a reputable study on the 
harmful effects of SOCE, particularly one that focuses on its effects on 
minors.206  By showing that SOCE results in actual harm and that SB 1172 
protects against that harm, the State will be better positioned to fend off 
 201.  See, e.g., First Resort, Inc. v. Herrera, No. C 11-5534 SBA, 2012 WL 
4497799, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2012) (dismissing all but the First Amendment 
challenge to San Francisco’s ordinance prohibiting CPCs from making false or 
misleading representations about their stance on abortion).   
 202.  See Lewis v. Pearson Found., Inc., 908 F.2d 318, 319 (Mo. 1990) (detailing a 
visit to a CPC where the center personnel claimed that they would help the patient 
obtain an abortion but instead showed her graphic images and sent her to a hospital that 
did not provide abortions).  
 203.  Cf. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 768 (Cal. 1992) (noting that 
misrepresentation includes statements the speaker believes to be true but for which the 
speaker has no reasonable basis).  
 204.  See Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings at 9:20-22, Welch v. Brown, 907 F. 
Supp. 2d 1102 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (conceding that many of the SOCE treatments are 
indisputably conduct and subject to the state’s regulation). 
 205.  Cf. Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 519 (1983) (recognizing states’ 
broad discretion in regulating medical standards, provided they do not deviate from 
accepted practices).  
 206.  See APA TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 3-4 (finding that SOCE studies are 
inconclusive as to whether SOCE is harmful to minors because the methods utilized in 
the studies were questionable and only involved adults).   
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constitutional challenges to SB 1172.207 
V. CONCLUSION 
The rights guaranteed by the United States and California constitutions 
are the bedrock of society, and only the most important governmental 
interests can, and should, justify an intrusion upon those rights.208  
However, those rights cannot be used as a sword to strike down any valid 
regulation that one might find disagreeable.209 
SB 1172 is merely one more permissible regulation in a series of 
regulations in the medical field that safeguard citizens; it does not infringe 
on any fundamental rights.210  To allow therapists to claim that the First 
Amendment insulates words used during therapy sessions from regulation 
would leave the entire mental health field unregulated and would protect 
traditional physicians from liability resulting from misdiagnoses and 
prescriptions for incorrect medications.211  For the medical profession to 
remain effective and safe, the state must be allowed to regulate those 
procedures that pose a threat to its citizens.212  Likewise, while the state 
may not target those religious practices and beliefs that it finds offensive, 
state and federal constitutions must allow the states to make laws that 
promote the health and safety of its citizens without fear that any person 
claiming the law conflicted with her religious belief would be able to 
circumnavigate the law.213  For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit must affirm 
 207.  Cf. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 961-62 
(9th Cir. 2009) (determining that while the state has a compelling interest in protecting 
the psychological welfare of minors, there must be proof of actual harm).  
 208.  See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis 
of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 815 (2006) (reviewing 
4,000 laws that infringed on speech and finding that only twenty-two percent survived 
strict scrutiny).  
 209.  Cf., e.g., McChesney v. Hogan, No. 9:08-CV-1186, 2012 WL 3686083, at *19 
(N.D.N.Y. July 30, 2012) (rejecting the argument that mandated sexual offender 
counseling infringes on the free exercise of religion even if the programs reference 
religion).  
 210.  Cf. United States v. Lane Labs-USA Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 222, 236 (3d Cir. 
2005) (affirming an injunction against the distribution of drugs that the FDA had not 
yet approved).  
 211.  Cf. O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 
1152 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (finding that the First Amendment does not protect doctors when 
prescribing drugs).  
 212.  Cf. Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of 
Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1054 (9th Cir. 2000) (indicating that the state owes a duty 
to its citizens to protect them from incompetent, irresponsible, or untrustworthy 
professionals who seek to obtain money through provision of these services). 
213.  Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (explaining that the 
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its original decision, should it grant the plaintiffs motion for rehearing. As 
Justice Scalia noted, any other result would lead to anarchy.214 
Free Exercise of Religion Clause embraces two distinct concepts: that the freedom to 
believe is absolute and that the freedom to act on those beliefs is not).  
 214.  See Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 
(1990) (noting that to allow a person to ignore the law in favor of personal beliefs 
would be equivalent to making religion superior to the law).  
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